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ABSTRACT
Biometrics is a science that utilizes a person's physical
characteristics to identify that person. Biometrics was thought of
as merely science fiction, but now it is growing to be a part of
everyday life. The law has had to change rapidly to keep up with
the growing technology. This article addresses four major areas
of biometrics and the legal implications involved, including: (1)
facial recognition technology and camera surveillance, (2)
regulation of those who enter the United States through biometric
identifiers, (3) smart cards and national ID cards, and (4) DNA
Databases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics came to the forefront of people's imaginations with
George Orwell's 1984. He created a world where cameras watched
your every move and heard your every word.1 However, the field of
biometrics was created long before the world of 1984. It began with
Alphonse Bertillon, chief of the criminal identification division for the
Paris police department. Bertillon used anthropometry, or the use of
different body sizes and proportions, to identify criminals in the mid-
nineteenth century. Bertillon's method lost popularity, however
when fingerprints began to be used in the late nineteenth century.
3
Fingerprints have been an invaluable tool in criminal investigations
ever since. Even though biometrics has historically been used in the
* Margaret Betzel is a candidate for juris doctor at The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law, class of 2006. She holds a bachelor's degree in zoology and chemistry from Miami
University of Ohio.
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Books Ltd. 1950) (1949).
2 Anthropometry, WIKIPEDIA (2005), at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropometry (last
visited Apr. 3, 2005).
3 Anil K. Jain, Salil Prabhakar, & Arun Ross, An Introduction to Biometric Recognition
(appeared in 14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECHNOLOGY:
SPECIAL ISSUE ON IMAGE-AND VIDEO-BASED BIOMETRICS, 4 (2004), available at
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criminal setting, biometrics today is increasingly being used in
everyday life.
A. WHAT IS BIOMETRIcs?
Biometrics involves techniques used to identify individuals based
on a particular trait or physical characteristic unique to that
individual.4 Any human physiological and/or behavioral characteristic
can be used as a biometric characteristic as long as it satisfies the
following requirements:
Universality: each person should have the characteristic;
Distinctiveness: any two persons should be sufficiently
different in terms of the characteristic;
Permanence: the characteristic should be sufficiently
invariant (with respect to the matching criterion) over a
period of time;
Collectability: the characteristic can be measured
quantitatively.
5
B. THE Two FUNCTIONING MODES OF BIOMETRICS SYSTEMS:
VERIFICATION MODE AND IDENTIFICATION MODE
A biometric system is "a pattern recognition system that operates
by acquiring biometric data from an individual, extracting a feature set
from the acquired data, and comparing this feature set against the
template set in the database."6  These systems acquire and use
biometric information in four steps: (1) a physical characteristic is
scanned, (2) the characteristic is converted into digital code, (3) the
code is stored in a database, and (4) the database and digital code are
4 Lisa Jane McGuire, Comment, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method
of Identification May Mean Giving Up You Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REv. 441,444 (2000).
5 Jain, supra note 3, at 1-2.
6 1d at2.
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accessed to identify the individual at a later time.7 Biometrics systems
can operate in two modes: a verification mode or an identification
mode.
In verification mode, the biometric system validates a person's
identity by comparing the person's biometric data with the stored
biometric data previously collected and stored in the system database.
8
Common non-biometric verification mode systems include the use of a
PIN number, a user name, or a password. 9 For example, when a
person enters a password to log on to his or her computer, the
computer conducts a one-to-one comparison to determine whether the
claimed user is the correct person. The verification mode is usually
used for positive recognition, where the goal is to prevent multiple
people from using the same identity. 10
In general, systems that operate in verification mode are successful
and function well." However, verification systems can make two
types of errors: mistaking biometric measurements from two different
persons to be from the same person (called a false match) and
mistaking two biometrics measurements from the same person to be
from two different persons (called a false non-match). 12 These errors
in identification can be caused by a variety of factors, including
imperfect imaging conditions (for example, with the use of a finger
scanner, there could be sensor noise or dry fingers), changes in the
user's physiological or behavioral characteristics (for example, cuts
and bruises on the finger), ambient conditions (for example, changes in
temperature and humidity), and the user's interaction with the sensor
(for example, finger placement). 13
7 Robert H. Thornburg, Comment, Face Recognition Technology: The Potential Orwellian
Implications and Constitutionality of Current Uses Under the Fourth Amendment, 20 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 321, 323 (2002).
8 Jain, supra note 3, at 2.
91Id.
11 BROMBA, BIOMETRICS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.bromba.com/faq/
biofaqe.htm#Biometrie (last visited April 27, 2005).
12 Jain, supra note 3, at 5.
" Id. at 4-5.
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In every verification system, there is a trade-off between the false
match rate and the false non-match rate. 14 If a system's sensitivity
threshold is increased to allow for fewer false matches, then there will
be more false non-matches. If a system's sensitivity threshold is
lowered to allow for fewer false non-matches, then there will be more
false matches.
A biometric system that functions in identification mode
recognizes a person by searching all the users in the database for a
match.'5 In this case, the system conducts a one-to-many comparison
to establish a person's identity.16 The identification mode is generally
used for negative recognition, where the goal is to prevent a person
from using multiple identities.' 7 Unlike systems that function in
verification mode, which can use non-biometric data to meet its goals,
negative recognition can only be established through systems that use
biometric data.18
C. WHAT TECHNOLOGIES DOES BIOMETRICS COVER AND WHAT ARE
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH?
There are many technologies encompassed within biometrics.
Each system has its own strengths and weaknesses. The choice of
which system to use depends upon its application. A biometrics
system is assessed through a variety of factors, including: recognition
accuracy, speed, resource requirements, effect on users (the biometrics
system should be relatively harmless), acceptability by the intended
population, and resistance to various fraudulent methods and attacks to
the system.19 Below, is a brief discussion of the most commonly-used
systems and their strengths and weaknesses.
Face: Facial images are the most commonly used biometric
characteristic. 0  Many people present a photo ID of
14 Id at5.
" Id. at2.
161id
17 Jain, supra note 3, at 2.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 8.
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themselves almost daily. However, there now exist
biometric systems that can verify that you match your
picture. These systems are often limited because they
require a fixed and simple background or special
illumination. 21 They also have difficulty with identification
if the image of the face is taken from a drastically different
viewpoint than the stored image.22 There is also a question
as to whether the face provides a sufficient basis for
recognizing a large number of identities.23 Faces change
throughout the aging process or can be altered using
contacts, makeup, or even a different hairstyle.24
Signature: It is commonly accepted that a person's signature
is unique to them. Signatures have been accepted as a
biometric identifier in government, legal, and commercial
transactions as a method of identification. However,
signatures are a behavioral biometric and may change over a
period of time, as well as be influenced by physical and
emotional changes in the person.26 Professional forgers may
also be able to reproduce signatures that fool biometric
systems.27
Fingerprint: Fingerprint identification is very commonly
used because of its accuracy in identifying an individual.28
Fingerprint scanners are also highly affordable (the cost is
approximately $20 when ordered in large quantities).2 9
2Id. at 9.
22 Jain, supra note 3, at 9.
23 Id.
24 Gwen Kennedy, Thumbs Up For Biometric Authentication!, 8 Comp. L. REv. & TECH. J.
379, 386-387 (2004).
25 Jain, supra note 3, at 11.
26 id.
27 Id.
28Id. at9.
29 id.
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However, the fingerprint is not a perfect identifier. A
fraction of the population is simply unsuitable for this type
of identification. Genetic factors, aging, environmental, or
occupational reasons (for example, the fingers of manual
labor workers have a large number of cuts and bruises on
them that may continually change their fingerprints) can
make matching the person's fingerprints nearly impossible.
30
DNA: Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) is found in the nucleus
of every person's cells. It is unique to each person, with the
exception of identical twins who share the same DNA. DNA
is commonly used in forensic applications for person
recognition. 3' There are three potential problems with the
use of DNA: 1. Contamination and sensitivity: It is easy to
steal a person's DNA and use it to implicate that person.
32
Furthermore, DNA samples are easily contaminated at the
laboratory level because some of the laboratory technicians'
DNA can get into the sample during processing. 2.
Automatic Real-time Recognition Issues: Assessing a DNA
sample is cumbersome, time-consuming, and requires
expertise.33  3. Privacy Issues: Information about
susceptibilities of a person to certain diseases could be
gained from the DNA sample. Because there is concern that
abuse of this information could lead to "genetic
discrimination," many are reluctant to expand the use of
DNA as an identifier.34
Keystroke: There is a theory that every person types on a
keyboard in a distinct way.35 Keystrokes could be monitored
30 Jain, supra note 3, at 9.
31 id. at 8.
32 id.
33 Id.
34 id.
35 Jain, supra note 3, at 8.
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unobtrusively; however, it is a behavioral biometric and may
change over time.36
Iris: The iris is the colored region of the eye. Its visual
texture is formed during fetal development and becomes
permanent by age two. 37 The iris is generally very complex
and distinctive for identification purposes (the iris is even
different in identical twins).38  It is rather easy for an
identification system to detect artificial irises.3 9 Early iris
systems were expensive and difficult to operate; however,
the newer systems are more affordable and user-friendly.40
Currently, iris scans are generally limited to high-end
security applications.41
The field of biometrics is progressing rapidly. The remainder of
this paper will discuss changes in the field of biometrics over the past
4 years and the legal problems that these technologies have
encountered. There are four major places where the use of biometrics
has overlapped with the law: (1) the fields of facial recognition
technology and camera surveillance (2) regulation of those who enter
the United States (3) smart cards, and (4) the use of DNA databases.
II. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND CAMERA SURVEILLANCE
George Orwell said it best when he penned, "there was of course
no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given
moment. ' 42 In Manhattan in 1998, volunteers counted 2,400 cameras
in public places used to catch red-light runners on the road, shoplifters,
361d
371 Id. at 10.
381d.
39 Id.
40 Jain, supra note 3, at 10.
41 Kennedy, supra note 24, at 385.
42 ORWELL, supra note 1, at 2.
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and drug sellers loitering near lampposts.43 Today, there is biometric
facial recognition technology that can match the recorded face to a
database.44 Even though this technology, and the potential for future
technologies, may seem intrusive, there is little constraint on public
surveillance.
A. CAMERA SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Many legal scholars argue that there is a right to anonymity under
the Fourth Amendment and that video surveillance should be under
strict control.4 5 The courts have disagreed.46 The Fourth Amendment
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describinf the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. ' 4  In a Fourth Amendment analysis, one must first
demonstrate that a person has a subjective expectation of privacy.48
Next, that expectation must be shown to be reasonable.
49
The Fourth Amendment has protected against unwanted
surveillance within the home.5 0 However, videotaping in public places
has been upheld under the Fourth Amendment. 51 But, the courts have
43 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 214 (2002).
44 Roberto Iraolo, Lights! Camera! Action! - Surveillance Cameras, Facial Recognitions
Systems, and the Constitution, 49 LoY. L. REv. 773 (2003).
45 See Slobogin, supra note 43; Iraolo, supra note 44.
46 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); but see Slobogin, supra note 43.
47 U.S.CONST. amend. IV.
48 Thornburg, supra note 7, at 339.
49 id.
50 See Payton v. United States, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1971).
51 See Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Department, 211 N.W.2d 674, 690 (Mich. Ct. App.
1973) in which the court held that a tavern was a public place and videotaping suspect did not
violate fourth amendment.
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recognized that there can be zones of privacy created in public
places.
52
In 2003, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the use of a
hidden camera worn by an informant was not an unreasonable search,
and therefore, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
53
A case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002
upheld the use of a hidden camera worn by a television reporter to
obtain information about a business on the business's premises. 54 The
Court found that because the manager of the business invited the
disguised reporter onto the premises and voluntarily gave her a tour,
the manager and the business did not have an objectively reasonable
expectation to solitude or seclusion.55 The Court also noted that the
manager's conversations with the reporter were not protected because
they merely discussed the operations of the company.56  Only the
privacy of individuals is protected, not the privacy of corporations.
In 2004, courts endorsed the wide use of video surveillance. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the use of cameras hidden in a
hotel room to capture a defendant's bribery transactions was not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment because the informant, who was
also videotaped and participated in the sting operation consented to
the taping.58 The court relied on Lopez v. United States,59 in which the
52 See Britt v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 374 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1962) in which the
court held that videotaping criminal through a peephole into a public restroom was a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The court stated, "Man's constitutionally protected right of
personal privacy not only abides with him while he is the householder within his own castle
but cloaks him when as a member of the public he is temporarily occupying a room --
including a toilet stall -- to the extent that it is offered to the public for private, however
transient, individual use. " Britt, 374 P.2d at 819. See also Ward v. State, 636 So. 2d 68 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) in which the court held that officers peeking into a public restroom
through a crack was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
53 United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2003).
54 Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. American Broadcasting Companies, 306
F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002).
55 Id. at 813; But see, United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1991) in which the court
held that a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office because it was
available for his exclusive use during working hours and that the use of a hidden camera to
tape his activities was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
161d. at 814.
57 Id.
58 United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2004).
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Court held that "if a person consents to the presence at a meeting of
another person who is willing to reveal what occurred, the Fourth
Amendment permits the government to obtain and use the best
available proof of what the latter person could have testified about."
60
The Third Circuit noted that the defendant had an expectation of
privacy in the hotel room when he was there alone.61 However, once
he admitted the informant into the room, this expectation of privacy
disappeared.62 Furthermore, the court noted that there was no
difference between an informant wearing the camera (which has
previously been upheld) and the placement of the camera in a hotel
room.63 Therefore, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
64
B. CAMERA SURVEILLANCE AND STATE LAW
Camera surveillance has also been associated with state law during
the year of 2004.
The California Court of Appeals upheld a state statute requiring
certain cybercafe owners to implement video surveillance to prevent
crime.6
5
The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a self-storage company
was contractually obligated to provide video surveillance because it
had signs posted that said "Smile you are being videotaped."
66
Finally, the Ohio Court of Appeals ruled this year that a video
conference was sufficient to satisf the confrontation clause for a
defendant during a parole hearing.6 Every criminal defendant has a
59 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
60 Lee, 359 F.3d at 200 (referencing Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439).
61 Id. at 201.
62 id.
61 Id. at 202.
64 For contrasting authority, see United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000) in
which the court held that video-tape that was recorded when the informants were not present
in the hotel room should be suppressed because the defendants had a legitimate expectation to
be free from surveillance.
65 Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 115 Cal. App. 4th 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
6 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Soulant Bros., No. 2003 2817, 2004 La. App. LEXIS 3128 (La. Ct. App.
Dec. 17, 2004).
67 Wilkins v. Wilkinson, 157 Ohio App. 3d 209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
[Vol. 1:2-3
constitutional right to confront his witnesses.68 The court found "that
the use of videoconferencing technology ,ermitted free and un-
impeded visual and auditory communication" which was sufficient to
satisfy the confrontation clause.
C. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
Facial recognition technology is a computer enhanced video
surveillance system. This technology has developed into a security
measure used to scan crowds and pick out known terrorists and
criminals. 70  The system uses two components: video cameras to
acquire the image of a person's face and computer software to analyze
that face for identification purposes. 7
This system was used at the 2001 Super Bowl at Tampa's
Raymond James Stadium.72 It has also been implemented in Tampa's
Ybor City entertainment district and the hockey arena of the Salt Lake
City Winter Olympics. 73 In both locations, the use of the technology
was discontinued due to its ineffectiveness. 74  Facial recognition
technology is currently being installed in airports around the country to
protect against terrorist attacks.75 To date, there has never been a
successful implementation of the technology and there has never been
a terrorist or wanted criminal arrested throu h these systems.
76
However, it is still seen as the wave of the future."
6 1Id. at 212.
6 91Id. at 215.
70 Thornburg, supra note 7, at 321.
71 d. at 325.
721d. at 321.
73 id.
74 id.
75 Thornburg, supra note 7, at 322. In January of 2002, both the Fresno International Airport
and St. Petersberg-Clearwater International Airport installed facial recognition systems.
Shortly thereafter, the systems were installed in Dallas/Fort Worth, Boston Logan, and Palm
Beach International Airports.
71 Id. at 321.
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Some privacy advocates argue that facial recognition systems may
violate the Fourth Amendment. As previously stated, in a Fourth
Amendment analysis, one must first demonstrate that a person has a
subjective expectation of privacy. 78 Next, that expectation must be
shown to be reasonable. 79 Although people typically do not have a
subjective expectation of privacy with regard to their face, if they put
on a hat or sunglasses, this may show that they have an expectation of
privacy. 80  Furthermore, it is possible to argue that just because a
person goes to the grocery store does not necessarily show sufficient
evidence of a lower expectation of privacy in his or her image. 8 1 As
far as addressing the reasonableness inquiry, some argue that some
uses of facial recognition technology may be per se unreasonable. 82 If
the technology progresses to the point where it can track a person's
day-to-day activities, it may be unreasonable and therefore violate the
Fourth Amendment.
83
III. REGULATION OF THOSE WHO ENTER THE UNITED STATES
Since September 11, 2001, there has been a dramatic increase in
public concern about who is allowed to enter and live in the United
States. In response, the federal government has implemented many
new laws and procedures. For example, commercial pilots are now
able to carry handguns and federal air marshals fly on many domestic
flights to prevent the threat of a terrorist attack.84 The new protections
also incorporate biometrics.
7 Id. at 339.
79 id.
80 Thomburg, supra note 7, at 345.
1' Id.
2 Id. at 346.
83 Id.
84 Eric P. Haas, Comment, Back to the Future? The Use of Biometrics. Its Impact on Airport
Security, and How This Technology Should Be Governed, 69 J. AiR L. & CoM. 459 (2004).
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A. US-VISIT
1. WHAT IS US-VISIT? A STATUTORY DESCRIPTION
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology Program (US-VISIT) began on January 12, 2004.85 This
program was implemented by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) as a response to several Congressional mandates that required
the Department to
create an integrated, automated entry exit system that records
the arrival and departure of aliens; that equipment be
deployed at all ports of entry to allow for the verification of
aliens' identities and the authentication of their travel
documents through the comparison of biometric identifiers;
and that the entry exit system record alien arrival and
departure information from these biometrically authenticated
documents.86
Under this program, visitors that enter the United States from certain
countries at select ports of entry will be photographed and
fingerprinted by Customs officials. 87 These visitors must also "check
out" when they leave through particular ports of entry.88 The data
collected is stored in the automated identification system (IENT)89
and will only be accessible by government 
officials. 9° "
US-VISIT will initially only apply to "covered individuals,"
defined as people who are "nonimmigrant visa holders traveling
through air and sea ports. '9 1  However, DHS does anticipate
85 Id. at 479.
86 Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 468, 468 (Jan, 5, 2004) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 214, 215, and
235).
87 Haas, supra note 84, at 479.
88 Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program, 69 Fed. Reg. at 473.
'9 Id. at 468.
90 Haas, supra note 84, at 479.
91 Id.
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expanding the program to "eventually have the capability to verify the
identities of most foreign national travelers through biometric
comparisons. 92
DHS has stated that it chose the collection of two fingerprints and
photographs because they are less intrusive than other forms of
biometric collections. 93  However, the Department has stated that it
may expand what is collected based upon necessity and improved
technology.94  If a fingerprint cannot be obtained from an alien, the
alien may provide another biometric identifier.95 However, when the
person's identity is not at issue and the alien cannot provide a
fingerprint, the requirement may be waived.96
The department implemented this program through a series of
amendments to regulations including, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(d),97 8 C.F.R.
92 Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program, 69 Fed. Reg. at 470.
93 Id. at 471.
94 Id
95 Id.
96 id
97 Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program, 69 Fed. Reg. at 470. This amendment allows DHS to require aliens who are arriving
at United States air and sea ports to provide photographs, fingerprints, or other biometric
identifiers. The amendment also provides that DHS will collect photographs and fingerprints
from aliens applying for nonimmigrant visa upon their arrival at United States air and sea
ports and upon departure.
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§ 235.1(d)(ii), 98 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a),99 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f), 100 as well as
enacting 8 C.F.R. § 215.8.01
2. Is US-VISIT A GOOD IDEA? CRITICISMS OF THE PROGRAM
US-VISIT has many supporters and many critics. Supporters
frame arguments around the threat of a terrorist attack due to lax
immigration laws, while critics worry about its impact on freedom and
privacy.
US-VISIT could potentially violate the Fourth Amendment's
protection of unwarranted search. However, the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Verdugo-Uquidez0 2 indicates that a
program only limited to "nonimmigrant visa holders traveling through
air and sea ports" will probably not fall within the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. 103 In Verdugo-Uquidez, the Court found that the
Fourth Amendment only protected "the people" being defined only to
include "a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country
to be considered part of the community. ' 10 4 The Court also noted that
"the Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission
98 Id. This amendment states that if an alien refuses to provide the requested biometrics
necessary to verify his identity and to authenticate travel documents, that alien may be
inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(7) of the INA for lack of proper
documents.
99 Id. This amendment states that if a nonimmigrant alien is required to provide biometric
identifiers, the alien's admission is conditioned on compliance with any such requirements.
Also, if the alien is required to provide biometric information upon departure, his failure to
comply may constitute a failure of the alien to maintain the terms of his immigration status.
100 Id. This amendment states that all nonimmigrant aliens will be issued the Form 1-94,
Arrival Departure Record. These forms must be surrendered upon departure unless the 1-94
was issued for multiple entries.
1o1 Id. This new regulation states that the Secretary of Homeland Security may establish pilot
programs at up to fifteen air or sea ports, through which the Secretary can require aliens who
are leaving the United States to provide photographs, fingerprints, or other biometric
identifiers and documentation to determine the alien's identity and whether he has properly
maintained his status while in the United States.
102 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
103 Haas, supra note 84, at 479.
104 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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for the first time to these shores.' 10 5 Because the Court has interpreted
the protections of the Fourth Amendment narrowly, and as long as US-
VISIT applies to a limited class of covered individuals, this program
should not constitute an unwarranted and unreasonable search. 106
Critics of US-VISIT have also expressed concern "over the cost,
the lack of technological sophistication required for such a system,
privacy loss possibilities, increases in racial profiling, and .... loopholes
in the system." 1
07
Researcher Richard Sobel has stated, "the government would do
much better using resources to better identify people [sic] and deter
people who might cause some harm than to use resources devoted to
the 99 percent of people who are innocent."
' 10 8
Other critics argue that visitors from twenty-eight nations,
including those nations whose citizens are not required to get visas for
short stays in the United States, will not be scanned, leaving the United
States just as open to terrorism. 10 9 Supporters of US-VISIT say that
exempt countries are those that will require biometric information on
their passports and that provides a sufficient safeguard."10
Critics are also concerned the methodology of the system. The
search for every alien will require the system to perform an
identification search of one fingerprint to millions of records of
fingerprints.'1 ' This presents the opportunity for false positives and
false negatives.
Id. at 271 (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 569 (1953)).
106 Haas, supra note 84, at 480.
107 Sarah McIntosh, Comment, Developments in the Executive Branch: Department of
Homeland Security Begins to Implement New US- VISIT Program, 18 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 433,
434 (2004).
108 Id.
109Id.
10Id.
11 Frank Moss, Changing the Face of Immigration: A Year in Transition, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.L.
CoMM. 41, 42 (2004) (transcription of comments made at the St. John's Journal of Legal
Commentary Symposium on Feb. 27, 2004).
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B. MExIcAN BORDER-CROSSING CARD PROGRAM
Recently, a new program was implemented for Mexican citizens
who work in the United States, but it has received little attention.
112
Under the old system, a Mexican citizen crossing the United States
border t6 work for the day had to stand in a long line to present a visa
or a passport. However, under this new program, if a Mexican citizen
presents a Border-Crossing Card, containing a machine-readable
biometric identifier, then he or she will be able to bypass the long line
and the visa application process."13
IV. SMART CARDS AND NATIONAL ID CARDS
A. WHAT IS A SMART CARD?
A smart card is a card that is embedded with either a memory chip
with non-progammable logic or a memory chip and a
microprocessor. 14 A card with a microprocessor can add, delete, and
manipulate information. 115 A memory-chip only card, such as a pre-
paid phone card, can only perform predefmed operations.1 16 Smart
cards differ from standard magnetic strip cards in that the smart card
carries all necessary functions and information on the card. 17 In
contrast, standard magnetic strip cards must have access to a database
at the time of the transaction to work."18
B. HONG KONG'S NATIONAL ID CARDS
In October of 2000, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
announced their plan to replace government-issued ID cards with
'12 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(c)(2) (2005).
13id.
114 SUN MICROSYSTEMS, DOCUMENTATION: SMART CARD OVERVIEW, at http://java.sun.com/
products/javacard/smartcards.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
115 id.
"1id.1176id.
1181d.
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smart identity cards. 1 9 In Hong Kong, it is mandatory for every
person above the age of 15 to register with the government, carry
"proof of identity," and produce this proof of identity when
requested. 120 The cards have the same basic data as a traditional ID
card such as name, date of birth, and immigration status.'1 21 However,
the card also stores unprecedented amounts of data, such as a digital
photograph of the cardholder and an algorithm of the cardholder's
thumbprints. 12 The Hong Kong government ID card has multiple
uses, from storing information regarding immigration status to use as a
library card.123 The Hong Kong government plans to expand the uses
of the smart card. These new uses include automatic voter registration
and a machine-scannable passport to go in and out of mainland
China.
124
C. SMART CARDS IN THE UNITED STATES
Although, smart cards have been widely used in Europe and Asia,
they are not as widely used in the United States. 125 The use of smart
cards in the United States is usually in a business setting or, as seen
more prominently, with travel.
1. IN AIRPORTS: THE TRUSTED TRAVELER SYSTEM
Smart Cards are already extensively used by airport employees to
control access to restricted airport areas. 126  These cards contain
119 Rina C.Y. Chung, Hong Kong's "Smart" Identity Card: Data Privacy Issues and
Implications for a Post-September 11th America, 4 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 442, 445
(2003).
"
2 0 Id. at 451-452. This is mandated by the Registration of Persons Ordinance. H.K.
Registration of Persons Ordinance ch. 177. Formally, this law required persons to card a
standard government issued ID, but now it will require persons to carry the newly issued smart
cards.
21 Id. at 445.
122 Id. at 446.
'
23 Id. at 461.
124 Chung, supra note 119, at 462-463.
121 Id. at 443-444.
126 Haas, supra note 84, at 481.
[Vol. 1:2-3
biometric components of the airport employees. 127 However, it has
been suggested that biometric smart cards be required of the general
traveler population.
US-VISIT, as previously discussed, currently only applies to
"covered individuals," or those people defined as "nonimmigrant visa
holders traveling through air and sea ports." However, government
officials have already recommended modifying the program to aid in
airport security. The most recent proposal is called "Trusted
Traveler."' 128  Initially, this program would be conducted on a
volunteer basis.129 The volunteers would agree to a background check
and would then receive a card as a "trusted traveler." r ° The card
would be a smart card that is made secure with biometric identifiers
such as fingerprints or an iris scan.131 The government claims that the
"Trusted Traveler" system would increase airport security while
decreasing the amount of time that travelers would have to spend at
security check points. 1
32
2. THE POTENTIAL FOR A UNIVERSAL SMART CARD SYSTEM
Many scholars believe that the United States will have some sort of
universal smart card system in the near future. According to Richard
Sobel, "[e]ven before the attacks on New York City and Washington,
D.C. on September 11, 2001, America was moving toward a system of
national identification numbers, databanks, and identity cards."' 33
Sobel claims that a national identification system was created by five
different statutory provisions: (1) The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 13 C (2) The Illegal Immigration Reform
127 id.
128 Id. at 480.
129 Id.
130 id.
131 Haas, supra note 84, at 480-481.
132ld. at 481.
133 Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification
Systems, 15 HARv. J. LAW & TECH. 319, 320 (2002) [hereinafter Sobel, Demeaning].
134 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
This statute required that employers have employees fill out and sign an 1-9 verification form
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and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 135 (3) The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 ("Welform Reform Act"), 136 (4) The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),137 and (5) The Federal
Aviation Administration ID requirement and Computer Assisted
Passenger Screening System ("CAPS").138  However, will these
systems ever evolve to incorporate biometric identifiers?
In 1996, the Department of Transportation suggested a plan for a
federalized driver's license that would include a biometric identifier.
139
Proponents of the plan stated that it would reduce the number of
forged identity documents used by illegal immigrants to gain federal
benefits. 140  In response to the proposal, the State of Georgia began
placing fingerprints on Georgia driver's licenses in April 1996.1
4 1
California, Colorado, Florida, and Hawaii already required fingerprints
on their driver's licenses before the proposal was made. 4 2 Support for
to prove that they are U.S. citizens or have clearance to work in the United States. Sobel,
Demeaning, supra note 133, at 325.
i35 Illegal Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009-546 to 3009-724 (1996). This statute required employees to show their employers
identification to prove citizenship or government permission to work. Sobel, Demeaning,
supra note 133, at 324.
136 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). This statute created a federal database to track all newly
hired employees. The database recorded names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and
wages of all employees hired after October 1, 1997. Sobel, Demeaning, supra note 133, at
324-25.
137 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996). This statute required the development of a "unique health identifier" and a
national electronic collection system for personal health care data. Sobel, Demeaning, supra
note 133, at 325.
138 FAA procedure dictates that airlines request identification from passengers before they are
allowed to board. The FAA directive, which is the basis for this ID requirement, appears not
to have been released. Sobel, Demeaning, supra note 133, at 325-326, 387 n. 27; see also
Sobel, Degradation, infra note 139.
139 Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Identification
System, 8 B.U. J. Sa. & TECH. L. 37, 44 (2002) [hereinafter Sobel, Degradation].
140 id.
141 Id.
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this type of national identification system has grown since the attacks
of September 11, 2001.143
Supporters of a national identification system with biometric
identifiers claim that it would be one of the best ways to prevent
terrorists from operating under assumed names and to protect secured
locations, such as airports. 144  Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle
Corporation, has proposed a national database that contains a
combination of many t es of biometrics including thumb prints, hand
prints, and iris scans.1  The proposed database would also contain
information such as names, addresses, places of employment, amounts
and sources of income, purchases, assets, and travel destinations. 146
Under Ellison's system, to gain entry into an airport, people would
have to present a photo ID, put their thumb on a fingerprint scanner,
and tell the guard what their social security number was. 147 Ellison's
company, Oracle, has "already offered to provide the necessary
software for free, and [] other companies would pitch in with hardware
and support.'
148
Other supporters of a national identification system have claimed
that it would "aid in fraud prevention..., catch 'deadbeat dads,' enable
electoral reforms, allow quick background checks for those buying
guns or other monitored items, and prevent illegal aliens from working
in the United States."'
149
Critics of national identification cards, with or without biometric
information, state that such a system would impact due process,
freedom from unreasonable search, free expression, the right to
employment, separation of powers, freedom of travel, and
143 Sobel, Demeaning, supra note 133, at 332.
'44 Id. at 334.
145 Id.
46id.
147 Id.
14 Id. (citing Larry Ellison, Digital Ids Can Help Prevent Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2001
at A26).
149 Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56 FLA.
L. REv. 697, 702-703 (2004) (citing Committee on Authentication Technologies and Their
Privacy Implications, National Research Council, IDs-Not that Easy: Questions About
Nationwide Identity Systems, at 6 (Stephen T. Kent & Lynette I. Millet eds., 2002)).
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federalism. 150  Sobel has stated that "the existence of databanks and
identification schemes implies that society has a right to surveil its
subjects and to define individual identities separate from the inherent
nature of personhood."'
15 1
Those in Hong Kong have responded to the new national smart
card system with an increased concern and awareness of privacy
issues. Stephen Lau, Hong Kong's Privacy Commissioner at the time
the smart card plan was unveiled, claimed that historically, Chinese
people did not possess a strong concept of "privacy."' 152 However, a
recent survey conducted by the Privacy Commission showed that the
Chinese people ranked privacy as their third most important priority,
after unemployment and environmental protection, but before food
hygiene and medical services.1 53 Residents of Hong Kong worry that,
although the government has said that it will be careful with biometric
data, this data may find its way into the hands of the private sector.'
54
However, the people of Hong Kong still think that the smart card is the
best form of identification and use it for such.
155
V. DNA DATABASES
The use of deoxyriboneuclic acid (DNA) in law enforcement has
grown in recent years. DNA is extremely helpful in the identification
of a criminal. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have
implemented laws requiring convicted criminals to submit their DNA
so that it may be stored in criminal databases. 1 6  The federal
government has also enacted a statute authorizing a DNA databank.1
57
These laws were heavily challenged during the year of 2004, and the
150 Sobel, Demeaning, supra note 133, at 320.
"' Id. at 322.
152 Chung, supra note 119, at 446.
113 Id. at 446-447.
'541d. at 447.
155 id.
156 John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposal for Complete DNA
Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 131-32 (2000).
157 DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2068 (codified at U.S.C.
§ 14131-34).
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vast majority were laws upheld. 158  But, would a federal law
mandating a complete DNA database of the entire United States
citizenry be justified and upheld?
A. DNA DATABASES IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
For most people, DNA collection from criminals is a sensible
extension of biometric technology. This system has its critics,
however. Benajamin Keehn, a Boston public defender representing
prisoners suing to avoid DNA collection, has said that DNA collection
"amounts to an unconstitutional warrantless search on a national scale.
It's a computer-age version of 'round up the usual suspects."' 1 59
Others have agreed with him, and there have been many different
challenges to DNA collection statutes, including challenges under the
Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment.
1. DNA COLLECTION CHALLENGES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 160  The courts have been divided on their
approach to the DNA collection statutes. Some courts have found that
the collection of DNA constituted a Fourth Amendment search, but
upheld the search under a special needs test. 16 1  Other courts havedenied that there was a Fourth Amendment search at all. 162  In yet
158 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) in which the court upheld
California's DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 under the 4th Amendment. See
also Moss v. Johnson, 2:04-CV-0142, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20049 (N.D. Tex. 2004) in
which the court upheld Texas' DNA collection statute under the first amendment free exercise
clause, the fourth amendment, the fifth amendment, the fourteenth amendment, and the eighth
amendment.
159 Cronan, supra note 156, at 142 (citing Richard Willing, FBIActivates 50-State DNA
Database Tuesday, USA TODAY, Oct. 12,1998, at Al).
160 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
161 See Green v. Berge (7th Cir. 2004), 354 F.3d 675 in which the Seventh Circuit held that the
DNA collection of criminals was reasonable because it met the special needs test. The Court
noted that "The DNA Act, while implicating the Fourth Amendment, is a reasonable search
and seizure under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
because the desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the ordinary law enforcement need."
162 See Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
The New York District Court suggested that collection of DNA from a criminal may not
constitute as a search under the Fourth Amendment.
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another approach, others courts have upheld the statutes because the
search was not considered unreasonable.1
63
2. DNA COLLECTION CHALLENGES BASED ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment guarantees freedom from self-
incrimination. 164 Some challengers of the DNA collection statutes
argue that the mandatory collection of DNA violates this right against
self-incrimination. 165 It has been said that any Fifth Amendment
challenge to DNA testing must fail because DNA samples are not
testimonial in nature.' 
66
B. COMPLETE DNA DATABASES
Although criminal DNA databases are usually accepted and
approved, DNA databases containing all people in the United States
are more controversial. One supporter has proposed that DNA
databases be expanded to contain every person in the country through
three methods of DNA collection: (1) Collection at birth, (2) collection
from new entrants into the country, and (3) continuing collection from
certain classes of criminals. 
167
Opponents of universal DNA databases argue that this type of
collection would violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unwarranted and unreasonable searches. Others critics stated that the
implementation of a universal DNA database would create a nation of
suspects and dramatically change the relationship between the
government and the citizenry. 168  Under this theory, the database
163 Id. The New York District Court held that DNA collection of criminals was reasonable.
The court balanced the search's intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment Rights against
the government's interests in pursuing the search. The court considered the strength of the
individual's privacy interest, the nature and scope of the intrusion, and the government interest
at stake.
164 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
165 Lloyd v. Mechling, 848 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
'66See id.
167 Cronan, supra note 156, at 137-138.
16' D.H. Kaye & Micheal E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and
the Casefor Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 413, 446 (2003).
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would create an "ethos of suspicion. ' 69 Another argument is that a
universal database could never be implemented because the general
public opposes it. 170 Finally, others challenge the expense of creating
and maintaining such a system.'
71
Proponents of universal DNA databases state that a database of this
type would lead to increased conviction rates, deterrence leading to a
lower crime rate, and reduction of wrongful arrests.' 72 This system
could also decrease the number of missing persons.' 73 Proponents also
note that the current system is quite skewed because of the large
number of felons who are black males. 174 If the general population
were allowed to be sampled, this would clearly decrease the internal
bias present in the current system. 1
75
VI. CONCLUSION
As we head further into the new millennium, biometrics will
undoubtedly become a part of everyday life. This will present new
challenges to the legal system. Policy-makers will have to resolve the
tension between regulating technology and allowing progress to be
made. They will have to decide between identifying individuals for
safety reasons and maintaining a person's right to anonymity.
Although biometrics is science and technology on its surface, it is a
tension between values and policies at its core. The regulation of
biometrics will be an on-going debate for decades to come.
169 id.
70 Id. at 440-441.
.. Id. at 449.
172 See Cronan, supra note 156.
173 Kaye, supra note 168, at 450.
14 Id. at 452-53.
115 Id. at 454.
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